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Volume 19 Summer 1986 Number 2
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME
FOR ANTARCTICA
John J. Barceld IIf
FOREWORD
In a world of shrinking natural resources, Antarctica's hydrocar-
bon and mineral potential-a potential as yet unproved-has aroused
steadily growing interest in the continent. The nations that have gov-
erned Antarctica under the 1959 Antarctic Treaty1 are now seeking a
mineral regime to allow exploration and exploitation of the continent's
mineral wealth. Certain non-treaty nations have challenged the right
of the members of this special club, the Antarctic Treaty parties, to
decide the minerals question among themselves. They argue that the
issue should be decided by the United Nations and that the "common
heritage of mankind" concept that gained such currency in the U.N.
law-of-the-sea negotiations should apply to all Antarctic minerals and
resources.
2
t The A. Robert Noll Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies,
Cornell Law School.
1. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780,402 U.N.T.S. 71.
The complete text of the Treaty appears in the Appendix, infra.
2. The 1982 U.N. Law of the Sea Convention expressly adopts the "common heritage
of mankind" principle for the seabed area beyond national jurisdiction. Under that princi-
ple no state may exercise sovereignty over or appropriate any right in the resources of this
area. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, arts. 136, 137, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
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Another threat to the current Antarctic regime comes from the
difficulty of accommodating within the 1959 treaty system the special
set of national interests tied to minerals development. For instance,
the 1959 Treaty calls for decisions to be taken by consensus. If that
rule is carried over into the minerals regime, however, each of the cur-
rent decision-making parties-including the United States and Soviet
Union-would have a stranglehold on future hydrocarbon develop-
ment in Antarctica. Neither superpower is likely to enjoy the prospect
of giving such a veto to the other. But the search for a less-than-con-
sensus rule has the paradoxical potential of driving the treaty parties
toward a system that gives too much recognition to the territorial
claims of the claimant states. For example, one such arrangement
might require the relevant claimant state's consent to any mineral
exploration or exploitation in that state's claimed region. The virtue
of a consensus regime, by contrast, lies in its continued finesse of the
rights of states who claim territorial sovereignty in areas of Antarctica.
Under a consensus rule nothing happens in any part of Antarctica of
which the respective claimant state does not approve. At the same
time no state's territorial claim is directly acknowledged.
The prospect of a mineral regime for Antarctica evokes a different
set of misgivings in environmentalists. They justly fear that any signif-
icant exploration or exploitation of Antarctica's supposed mineral
wealth will destroy the continent's fragile ecosystem.
For a fuller understanding of these issues, which are among those
taken up by the papers in this symposium, it may be helpful to review
briefly the development and content of the current governing regime
for Antarctica: the "Antarctic Treaty System."
A. THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM 3
From 1908 to the early 1940's the following seven countries, in
the order listed, claimed sovereignty over different sectors of Antarc-
tica (totaling approximately 85% of the land area): the United King-
dom, New Zealand, France, Australia, Norway, Chile, and
Argentina.4 The claims were based not on effective occupation, but on
early exploratory and scientific expeditions, and to some extent on
marine resources exploitation. 5 The claims of the United Kingdom,
Chile, and Argentina overlap,6 thus these countries refuse to recognize
3. For a concise but informative discussion of the Antarctic Treaty System, see
Kimball, "Antarctica: Testing the Great Experiment," 27 ENVIROMENT 14 (1985). Much
of the factual information on the Antarctic Treaty System that follows is drawn from this
source.
4. Id. at 16.
5. Id.
6. See map, Appendix, infra.
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one another's claims. Moreover, the United States and the Soviet
Union (and all other countries of the world not making territorial
claims to Antarctica themselves) have refused to recognize any territo-
rial claims. Both the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in
early activities on the subcontinent and thus have a basis for a territo-
rial claim, but each has refused to reduce that claim to specific terri-
tory-in effect reserving the right to claim all of Antarctica, or at least
an interest in all of Antarctica. About 15% of Antarctica is not
expressly claimed by any country.
In the two decades prior to adoption of the Antarctic Treaty of
December 1, 1959, 7 the countries in the region seemed at times on the
verge of open conflict. There were various flare-ups among the states
with overlapping claims. The seven claimant states sought at every
turn to reaffirm their claims vis-6-vis nonclaimants. There was also a
growing fear, especially during the 1950's, that the cold-war military
rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union would spread
to Antarctica.
B. THREE GOALS: DEMILITARIZATION, SCIENTIFIC
COOPERATION, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PRESERVATION
To avoid these pitfalls, the seven claimant states and five others
(U.S., U.S.S.R., Japan, Belgium, and South Africa)-twelve states in
all-entered the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. The Treaty has two primary
goals: 1) to preserve Antarctica as an area for peaceful uses only; and
2) to promote freedom of scientific investigation throughout the conti-
nent. To achieve these ends, the Treaty prohibits all military activi-
ties, weapons testing, nuclear explosions, and disposal of nuclear
wastes in Antarctica.8 It also guarantees freedom of scientific enquiry
in Antarctica and obligates the parties to exchange scientific personnel
and experimental results. 9 The treaty parties have taken decisions
within the treaty system that articulate a third goal: protecting the
unique environment and ecosystem of Antarctica. Although no treaty
language announces this purpose with complete clarity, the Treaty
does prohibit nuclear explosions and radioactive waste disposal in
Antarctica and calls for the treaty parties to consult on the "preserva-
tion and conservation of living resources in Antarctica."' 0
7. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1.
8. Id. at arts. I, V, (1).
9. Id. at arts. II, II.
10. Id. at art. IX (f).
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C. ARTICLE IV: STANDSTILL ON TERRITORIAL CLAIMS
Article IV, concerning the rights of the claimant and nonclaimant
states, is the cornerstone of the Treaty. It uniquely sidesteps the
intractable issue of territorial claims by providing that none of the
agreed upon cooperative activities under the Treaty is to prejudice or
affect in any way the legal rights and claims of either the claimant or
nonclaimant states. No new claims are to arise; no enlargement of
existing claims is to occur; and no renunciation, dimunition, or denial
of claims is to be grounded upon the parties' cooperative activities
under the Treaty. Because of Article IV's pivotal role, its operative
language is worth repeating here:
No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall
constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial
sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No
new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in
Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force. 1
Two other treaty provisions buttress this central feature of the
Antarctic legal regime: 1) all decisions are to be taken by unanimity;12
and 2) all decision-making parties are entitled to free and unhindered
on-site inspection of all installations and all vessels and aircraft (at
points of loading and unloading) in Antarctica.' 3 The unanimity pro-
vision assures both claimants and nonclaimants that nothing will be
permitted in Antarctica that would prejudice their respective claims or
legal positions. On-site inspection ensures full compliance with the
treaty provisions and subsequent implementing agreements.
The treaty parties have also bound themselves to prevent even
non-party states from acting in any way inconsistent with the goals
and principles of the Antarctic Treaty. Article X provides that each
treaty party "undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, consistent with
the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one engages in
any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or purposes of the
present Treaty." Thus, under Article X the treaty parties would be
obligated to resist any efforts of non-party states to assert new claims
to sovereignty over any area of Antarctica, ' 4to infringe the freedom of
scientific inquiry, to use any part of Antarctica for military purposes,
or to act in a way that imperils the fragile Antarctic ecosystem.
11. Id. at art. IV.
12. Id. at art. XII.
13. Id. at art. VII.
14. Presumably a non-party's refusal to recognize the claims of the claimant states
would be entirely consistent with Article IV and would not require the treaty parties to
take any particular opposing action under Article X. This point is central to the analysis in
Professor Bruno Simma's article, The Antarctic Treaty as a Treaty Providing for an "Objec-
tive Regime," 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 189 (1986).
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During or after the year 1991, if any decision-making party so
requests, the treaty parties are obligated to hold a conference to review
the operation of the Antarctic Treaty system.15
D. Two-TIERED TREATY PARTY STRUCTURE
For decision-making purposes the parties to the Antarctic Treaty
fall into two groups: 1) the so-called "consultative parties" (who have
the power to make decisions); and 2) the "non-consultative parties"
(who technically have no vote).
1. Consultative Parties
The consultative, or decision-making, parties meet biennially to
consider pending issues concerning the governance of Antarctica and
implementation of the Treaty. 16 The consultative parties are the origi-
nal twelve parties to the 1959 Treaty and six additional countries who
were later adherents: Poland (1977), West Germany (1981), Brazil
(1983), India (1983), the People's Republic of China (1985), and Uru-
guay (1985). Any party to the Treaty can become a consultative party
through demonstrating "interest in Antarctica by conducting substan-
tial scientific research activity there, such as the establishment of a
scientific station or the despatch of a scientific expedition."' 7 The six
non-original consultative parties achieved consultative party status in
this manner, and five of these did so in the last five years.
2. Non-consultative Parties
There are also fourteen non-consultative parties to the 1959
Treaty. These countries have acceded to the Treaty but have not
established a scientific presence in Antarctica sufficient to give them
the rights of a consultative party. Since 1983, the consultative parties
have invited the non-consultative countries to attend the decision-
making meetings with observer status. The fourteen non-consultative
countries are: Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland,
East Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Papua New Guinea,
Peru, Rumania, Spain, and Sweden. Two of this group-Italy and
Sweden-have recently planned and conducted scientific investiga-
tions in Antarctica and are thus poised to become full consultative
parties.
15. Article XII says this obligation arises thirty years after the Treaty enters into force.
It entered into force in 1961.
16. The 13th Meeting of the Consultative Parties was held in Brussels during October,
1985.
17. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 1, at art. IX (2).
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At their biennial meetings the consultative parties have adopted a
number of recommendations, covering such matters as environmental
protection and preservation of species, exchange of scientific informa-
tion, tourism, communications, and the procedural aspects of deci-
sion-making. They have also completed two additional treaties: (1)
the 1972 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals; 18 and (2)
the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources. 19 As mentioned, they are currently negotiating a legal
regime for minerals development.
E. THE "COMMON HERITAGE" DEBATE
The traditional division of states into East-West or North-South
political groupings has little significance in the debate over Antarc-
tica's future mineral regime and governance system. Leading free-
world nations (the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, France)
and leading socialist countries (the Soviet Union, the Peoples' Repub-
lic of China, Poland) alike are full decision-making parties within the
Antarctic Treaty System. Thus they favor the current system of deci-
sion-making. The North-South picture is more varied and complex.
Four developing countries, Brazil, India, Chile, and Argentina are
actively negotiating the minerals regime question within the Antarctic
Treaty System. All four countries are consultative parties; Chile and
Argentina are also claimant states. Several other developing countries
participate in the negotiations as non-consultative parties. Still other
developing countries, however, such as Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda,
Ghana, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka,
and Thailand, are not parties to the Antarctic Treaty and have
objected to what they consider the exclusivity of the Antarctic Treaty
group. They would like to transfer jurisdiction over Antarctica to the
United Nations. Some of them have called for application of the
"common heritage of mankind" principle to the mineral resources of
Antarctica, and the United Nations General Assembly has already
begun intensive study of the "Question of Antarctica. '20
The issues raised by these developments, particularly the initia-
tive by part of the Third World for a "common heritage of mankind"
regime and the possibility that the United Nations will attempt to
18. Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 441,
T.I.A.S. No. 8826 (entered into force Mar. 11, 1978). This Treaty expressly affirms Article
IV of the Antarctic Treaty.
19. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20,
1980, 80 Stat. 271, T.I.A.S. No 10240 (entered itto force Apr. 7, 1982). This Treaty also
expressly affirms Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty.
20. The current debate in the U.N. concerning Antarctica is the subject of Hayashi.
The Antarctica Question in the United Nations, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 275 (1986).
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exercise some form of authority over Antarctica, can be telescoped
into two broad questions: (1) will the Antarctic Treaty System, as
now constituted, survive as the method of governance and decision-
making for Antarctica; and (2) if not, what will replace it?
Although they raise many issues concerning the Antarctic legal
regime, most of the authors in this symposium seem either to presup-
pose or to urge directly that the current treaty system be retained as
the governing mechanism for Antarctica.

